Sooner or later, someone is going to lose a laptop or a cell phone and you’ll need to revoke his/her certificate so that the thief can’t use your VPN. When you put a .ovpn file on an client, be certain that client has a good password (e.g. a good screen-lock PIN on your cell phone or a strong Windows password on your Windows PC - with a short timeout on the lock-when-idle.)

On the machine where you built your keys:

  • cd $EASY_RSA
  • Edit openssl*.cnf and change “default_crl_days= 30” to “default_crl_days= 14600” (40 years). If you don’t do this, your CRL will expire in a month and if your CRL expires, the server will refuse ALL logins.

      ./revoke-full user-key01-bogus

It will respond with “error 23 at 0 depth lookup:certificate revoked”. That’s what you want, but it is phrased confusingly.

If your keys are built on your Pi, execute:

mv ./keys/crl.pem /etc/openvpn/
sudo service openvpn restart

If your keys are built on your Mac:

  • On the Mac, execute:

      scp ./keys/crl.pem pi@raspi:crl.pem
  • On the Pi, execute:

      sudo mv ~/crl.pem /etc/openvpn/
      sudo service openvpn restart
  • Add the following to /etc/openvpn/server1.conf. (You couldn’t add it until you created a .pem file, or else OpenVPN will throw an error on startup.)

      crl-verify /etc/openvpn/crl.pem

And confirm that your client can no longer connect. (Because you revoked access.) Check /var/log/openvpn.log and confirm that you see “CRL CHECK FAILED” in it.

Test again by:

  • Import user-key02-bogus.ovpn into your OpenVPN client
  • Confirm that you can connect with bogus key 2
  • Confirm that you still cannot connect with bogus key 1
  • Revoke bogus key 2
  • Confirm that neither bogus key 1 or 2 can connect.

Note: If your CRL expires, just re-revoke any revoked certificate (or a new one). Revoking any certificate, even an expired one, re-generates the CRL.

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